to the conditions that would satisfy them, or to what they are about, only under some aspects and not othersand differences in the aspect under which are differences in content. Sartre, meanwhile, affirms only the first two theses, and embraces the second on different grounds from Husserl. On the other hand, going very far in that direction can bring puzzles of its own. We still could ask: But, what exactly does "consciousness" mean?
Anyone wanting to think carefully about consciousness must face the fact that the basic terms of discussion are infused with complex disagreements from the start. Syntax is not sufficient for crumbliness. If, as one interpretive approach suggests, Husserl holds consciousness (or rather, experience of the sort ordinarily involved in perceptual constancy) is intrinsically both relational and intentional, then the sort of consciousness we enjoy will be no more detachable in nature from its transcendent objects than. This case can be represented diagrammatically as in figure. In this section the issue of how consciousness is related to self-consciousness has been seen as a question of how it is related to state self-consciousness.
Now, let us return to Searle's concept and take a shot at understanding his philosophy of mind. But these experiences and the differences between them are dependent on our having mastered a series of linguistically impregnated cultural skills. This style of account, together with the Fregean thesis that sense determines reference, and the history of criticisms both have elicited, provide a significant part of the background of contemporary discussions of mental content. The biological and cultural resources that I must bring to bear on this task, even to form the intention to perform the task, are (considered in a certain light) truly staggering. 73 Acknowledgements page vi Introduction vii I The nature of Intentional states I 2 The Intentionality of perception 37 3 Intention and action 79 4 Intentional causation 112 5 The Background 141 6 Meaning 160 7 Intensional reports of Intentional states and speech acts 180. As for talk of intentionality as reference, just how are we to distinguish the way thoughts refer from the way names and descriptions do? Then certain prominent versions of reductionism are threatened.
Searle intentionality an essay